Once Upon a Time...  
Semantic approaches to fiction, literature, and narrative  

September 17-18, 2018, University of Groningen

Location: Norman Building, Lutkenieuwstraat 5

Program

Monday, Sept 17, 2018

09:00-09:30  Coffee/registration
09:30-10:00  Sofia Bimpikou, Emar Maier, and Merel Semeijn. “Once upon a time...”
10:00-10:35  Sonja Zeman. “Lost in time? Tense, narrativity, and the dimensions of fictionality”
10.35-11.10  Raphael Morris. “Semantic Parallels in Frame Narrative and Historical Fiction”
--20' break--
11:30-12:05  Louis Rouillé. “What can fictional disagreements tell us about fictional truth?”
12:05-12:40  Daniel Altshuler and Emar Maier. “Imaginative resistance as narrator accommodation”
--lunch--
13:40-14:40  Keynote 1: Márta Abrusán. “Protagonist projection and other types of narrative shift”
14:40-15:15  Andreas Stokke, “Fictions and Derived Contexts”
--10’ break--
15:25-16:00  Giuseppe Spolaore. “Knowledge ascriptions, fiction, and the historical present”
16:00-16:35  Elsi Kaiser, Catherine Wang and Gwennyth Portillo-Wightman. “Sensory effects on perspective shifting: An experimental investigation of visual, olfactory and gustatory perception in fictional narrative”
--10’ break--
16:45-17:45  Keynote 2: Alessandro Zucchi. “Reporting on content”

19:00  Conference dinner at El Txoco (Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 53)
Tuesday, Sept 18, 2019

09:30-10:30  Keynote 3: Stefan Hinterwimmer. “Narratorship and different kinds of perspective-taking”
10:30-11:05  Tatyana Skrebtsova. “Pragmatic presupposition across fiction and non-fiction”

--20’ break--
11:25-12:00  Jakob Egetenmeyer. “Temporal relations in Free Indirect Discourse interpreted within a Prominence-based temporal model”
12:00-12:35  Bart Geurts and Huub Vromen. “Common pretence”

--lunch--
13:30-14:05  Adrien Glauser. “Buck-Passing Naming Presuppositions”
14:05-14:40  Patrick Grafton-Cardwell and Daniel Altshuler. What makes a story (in)complete? A look at Daniil Kharms’ absurdist discourse

--5’ break--
14:45-16:15  Lightning talks + poster session (with coffee, snacks, drinks)
  • Merel Semeijn and Sofia Bimpikou. “The parafictional present”
  • Marianne Vergez-Couret and Janice Carruthers. “Un còp èra... Comparative Analyses in Occitan Oral Narratives”
  • Sara Meuser, Umesh Patil and Stefan Hinterwimmer. “Online response to perspective-taking in narratives”
  • Kamil Lemanek. “Fiction and Reference: Perry and Coco-Networks”
  • Sofia Bimpikou, “Representing speech, thought, and attitude in visual narratives”

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Merel Semeijn <m.semeijn@rug.nl>
Abstracts of keynote lectures:

**Protagonist projection and other types of narrative shift**

Márta Abrusán (Paris)

Natural language allows perspectival shift without overt operators. A well-known example is free indirect discourse (FID), but more recently other types of perspective shift were discussed as well: For example, *protagonist projection (PP)* (Holton 1996, Stokke 2013, Buckwalter 2014) and *viewpoint shift (VS)* in Hinterwimmer (2017). (Arguably, PP and VS describe the same phenomenon, and I will call it PP from now on). A major difference between FID and PP is that while FID shows certain quotation-like properties (cf. Maier 2015), PP does not, or only to a limited degree.

In this talk I discuss some data that are problematic for the above proposals and defend a modified version of Stokke's (2013) bi-contextual account of PP. According to this, FID and PP are two points on a continuum of perspectival shift. I propose to represent this by (a) loosening the semantic criteria on shiftable indexicals and (b) introducing pragmatic licensing conditions that guide hearers for choosing the right mode of interpretation.

**Narratorship and different kinds of perspective-taking**

Stefan Hinterwimmer (Köln)

Building on previous work (Hinterwimmer 2018), I compare the formal properties as well as the licensing conditions of two distinct kinds of protagonists’ perspective taking in narrative texts, *Free Indirect Discourse (FID)* and *Viewpoint Shifting (VS)*. In particular, I will take a close look at the role that the presence vs. absence of an involved narrator with an identifiable perspective has on the availability of FID and VS, respectively. As a case study, the interplay of the narrator’s and the main protagonist’s perspective in the crime novel *'Auferstehung der Toten'* ('Resurrection of the dead') by Wolf Haas will be discussed.
Sharing Real and Fictional Reference

Hans Kamp (Stuttgart/Austin)

This talk is about various applications of MSDRT, a formalism for the description of mental states and the semantics of attitude reports that is much like Emar Maier’s ADT. Central to the talk are ‘Entity Representations’, components of complex attitudinal states in the descriptions of mental states that MSDRT makes available. ERs have much in common with files, in the sense in which that notion has been used by, among others, Perry, Heim and Recanati.

The use of ERs in current MSDRT will be illustrated at the hand of a number of examples: the role of names in communication, deictic uses of demonstratives, counterfactual imagination and sharing between agents of reference to real entities and fictional characters.

Reporting on content

Alessandro Zucchi (Milan)

A fair amount of work has been done on the semantics of sentences reporting the content of fictional media, and this has given us many important insights about how fictional content is generated. Much less work has been done on how content of non-fictional media is generated. I argue that these tasks should be approached together and I sketch a theory of how media content is generated and reported on.
Lost in time?
Tense, narrativity, and the dimensions of fictionality
Sonja Zeman

“No Standard Semantics Were Harmed in the Making of This Story.”
(Bourne & Caddick Bourne 2016: 199)

1. In a nutshell
Starting with a revision of Hamburger’s (1987 [1957]: 61) hypothesis which claims that tenses ‘lose’ their grammatical meaning in narrative texts and mark instead fictionality released from time, the paper takes a closer look at the relationship between tense usage, narrativity, and fictionality. Based on an account of narration in terms of perspectivization and a diachronic analysis of tense configurations in German that are restricted to narrative contexts – i.e. the Epic Preterite (EP: Tomorrow was that interesting conference!), the Historical Present (HP: He came in and feels a rush of excitement.), and the Future of Fate (FoF: It was to be the best conference in his life.) –, it is argued (i) that the three tense configurations trigger only secondary effects of fictionality and (ii) that none of these fictionality effects is the result of ‘lost’ temporal features. Instead, the effects are shown to result from the interaction between the viewpoints established by grammatical means and the reference frames provided by the narrative discourse mode. Against this background, the paper offers a modified look on the relationship between temporality, narrativity and fictionality as well as a taxonomy of different dimensions of fictionality.

2. Theoretical premises: Tense & narrativity
The paper is based on a theoretical account that models the interaction between grammar and narrative discourse mode in terms of perspectivization, relying on the following premises.

(i) **Narration** is defined as a polyphonic viewpoint constellation that is the result of general linguistic mechanisms such as *shifting* and *displacement* in the sense of Bühler [1934] 1999 and Jakobson 1957. Whereas in non-narrative discourse speaking and observing subject are per default the same, narrative discourse is characterized by an unfolding of different narrative (i.e. speaker, narrator and character) levels. As such, the structure of narration is configured by hierarchical relationships that provide the potential for multiple viewpoints, whereby a relevant distinction is drawn between (i) ‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspectives with respect to the mental content, and (ii) ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ perspectives with respect to the communicative roles of the narrator’s and characters’ viewpoints.

(ii) **Tense** is defined as a grammatical category that is perspectival both in a deictic and an anaphoric sense (Jaszczolt 2018). First, it is perspectival in the sense that the verbal event is represented with respect to its proximity relation to the speaker’s *origo* by invoking temporal reference frames. Second, it is perspectival in the sense that it can “take” different temporal anchors given in discourse as reference points. In consequence, tenses in multiperspectival environments such as narratives can display more complex configurations than in non-narrative ones but do not ‘lose’ their grammatical semantics.
3. Analysis: Tense configurations in narratives

Based on these theoretical premises, three different “narrative” tense configurations in German are examined with respect to their viewpoint constellation in narrative discourse: The Epic Preterite (EP), the Historical Present (HP), and the so-called ‘Future of Fate’ (FoF). Each tense configuration will be (i) terminologically classified, (ii) analyzed with respect to the way(s) potential effects of fictionality are triggered and (iii) its source function in narratives within the early stages of German.

Based on this analysis, it is argued that the use of the preterite, the present tense, and the sollte + inf. construction in narrative discourse mode evokes the potential of multiperspectival meanings in the sense of Evans (2005: 99), which “encode potentially distinct values on a single semantic dimension, that reflect two or more […] distinct perspectives or points of reference”. These meanings can be explained as a result from the interplay between the core semantics and the structure of narrative discourse and are as such independent of fictionality. This is supported by the diachronic analysis which reveals that in the older stages of German, the EP is used in order to mark the distinction between the teller frame and the told story world, while the source function of the HP and the FoF can be traced back to meta-narrative devices. However, secondary effects of fictionality can emerge by the violations of access relations to mental contents.

4. Results: Dimensions of fictionality

The comparison of the three tense configurations leads to the following conclusions:

(i) Tenses keep their grammatical semantics in narrative texts, but the hierarchical structure of narrative context allows for a multiperspectival interpretation. The configurations are thus primarily narrative, not fictional ones. This is supported by the fact that all three tense configurations are documented also in non-fictional contexts.

(ii) The fictionality effects described in the literature are secondary features that result from different viewpoint constellations. Based on the distinction between different kinds of perspectives (see Premise 2-i), it is argued that violations with respect to the structural hierarchy trigger different effects of fictionality than violations with respect to access relations to mental content.

Based on these results, the paper argues for a more-dimensional approach of fictionality that differentiates between primary fictionality effects that concern the relation between the story and the real world, and secondary effects of fictionality that can result from violations of semantic viewpoint hierarchies as well as from mediacy effects on the structural level.

References

Semantic Parallels in Frame Narrative and Historical Fiction

Raphael Morris

Non-fictional sentences have a range of familiar properties, such as reference and truth-evaluable, that make them appropriate for a particular semantic treatment (e.g. Frege 1892; Davidson 1967, Lewis 1970). My project here is to demonstrate that at least some fictional sentences have the same properties and exhibit the same behaviour as non-fictional sentences. I take this to be grounds for subjecting these fictional sentences to the same semantic treatment we use for non-fictional sentences, in opposition to those who advocate for a distinction between the semantic treatment of fiction and that of non-fiction (e.g. Walton 1990; Braun 1993; Adams, Fuller & Stecker 1997).

Not all sentences in a work of fiction are properly ‘fictional sentences’. Particularly in works of historical fiction, sentences or even whole tracts may be non-fictional. For instance, when Victor Hugo (1862) halts the narrative of Les Misérables to provide extensive exposition about the Parisian sewers, this miniature essay is not fictional. It is a work of non-fiction, clearly designed to be informative about (and truth-evaluable with respect to) the actual world. This is apparent from both the language of the section itself (Hugo 1862, pp. 1061-75) and from the numerous commentators who complain about Hugo’s blatant insertion of non-fictional essays with little regard for the narrative (Denny 1982, pp. 8-11). The entire section contributes to the fiction only indirectly, by providing context: just as the world of the fiction resembles the actual world in so many other respects, so too do the sewers of the fictional Paris resemble the actual Parisian sewers.

Crucially, the same phenomenon can occur without any reference to the actual world. A prime example is the novel The Princess Bride (Goldman 1999). Unlike the better-known film adaptation, the novel contains a sophisticated framing device set in a world similar to our own, but with important distinctions. In the world of the frame story, Florin and Guilder are real countries, and ‘The Princess Bride’ is a novel written by a man called Simon Morgenstern. The frame story concerns the narrator – a fictional version of the book’s actual author, William Goldman – abridging the Morgenstern novel. In a parody of Hugo and others like him, Morgenstern’s novel contains several passages (Goldman 1999, pp. 65, 176 & 188) that interrupt the narrative to provide exposition about the Florin of the frame narrative world. I will characterise these passages as ‘frame-expository’, though it is important that they occur among the internal narrative and not the frame narrative.

From the perspective of someone in the world of the frame story, frame-expository passages are informative about (and truth-evaluable with respect to) the world in which they live. As evidence of this, we have the complaints of the frame story’s narrator, who omits many of these passages from his ‘abridged version’ of Morgenstern’s novel (Goldman 1999, pp. 65, 83 & 195), further lampooning authors like Hugo. And just as it was with Les Misérables, frame-expository passages contribute only indirectly to the internal fiction of Morgenstern’s novel, by providing context. Since the world of the framing device is itself fictional, these passages are themselves fictional. But there is good reason for thinking that frame-expository passages require the same semantic treatment as their non-fictional counterparts in historical fiction.

To further support the contention that readers in the frame narrative treat frame-expository passages the way we treat Hugo’s diatribe about the Parisian sewers, we can observe that both kinds of passages ‘misfire’ if their truth conditions are not met. For example, Dan Brown notoriously makes false claims in the (purportedly) non-fictional passages scattered among his novels (Sheaffer 2005). We rightly think that there is something wrong with these passages – specifically, we think
that the claims contained therein ought to be true, and they are not. Similarly, when Morgenstern’s exposition about the frame world implies that Paris existed before Europe, characters in the frame world rightly object on the grounds that such an implication is ludicrously false (Goldman 1999, p. 41). These objections only make sense if the characters in the frame narrative treat Morgenstern’s frame-exposition as we treat non-fiction.

The frame-expository passages in Morgenstern’s novel function the same way in contextualising the internal fiction regardless of whether the reader is in the world of the frame narrative or in the actual world. The passages allow the reader to import certain known facts about the frame world into the world of the internal fiction. But this only succeeds because the frame-expository passages are held to make factual, truth-evaluable claims about the frame world, just as the non-fictional passages of Les Misérables are held to make factual, truth-evaluable claims about the actual world. And the truth-conditions of these claims cannot disappear outside the context of the frame fiction (cf. Walton 1990), because they are needed by the actual reader to determine the context of the internal fiction.

Thus, the actual reader and the reader in the frame narrative must adopt the same semantic approach towards these frame-expository passages. Since the frame world reader gives such passages the semantic treatment that the actual reader gives non-fictional passages in historical fiction, the actual reader must also give the frame-expository passages that semantic treatment. And since the frame fiction is just another fiction, we have a scenario where the only difference between fictional and non-fictional sentences is that they are evaluated with respect to different worlds.

At the very least, this constitutes a serious objection to any theory that calls for radically different semantics for fiction and non-fiction across the board. Beyond this, it hints at the possibility of abolishing a semantic distinction between fiction and non-fiction entirely – perhaps fiction is just non-fiction evaluated with respect to worlds other than our own.

References:

What can fictional disagreements tell us about fictional truth?

Louis Rouillé

I begin with two orthogonal distinctions. One, taken from Köbel 2004 “Faultless disagreement”, between faulty and faultless disagreements. Faulty disagreements are situations in which the two parties hold incompatible views, and at least one of them is at fault (of course, both can be at fault at the same time). Faultless disagreements are situations in which the two parties hold incompatible views, and it is possible that neither of them is at fault: paradigm examples of faultless disagreements are two persons disagreeing about a matter of taste. Some philosophers do not accept this distinction, but I will not argue in favor of this distinction here.

The second, inspired by Friend 2011 “The great beetle debate. A study on imagining with names”, between real and fictional disagreements. Real disagreements are disagreements about the truth-value of a proposition whereas fictional disagreements are about the fictionality of a proposition. The truth-value of a proposition is grounded on worldly facts, or the knowledge we have thereof. The fictionality of a proposition, on the other hand, boils down to what is prescribed to be imagined by a work of fiction.

I think the logical space thus defined is not uniform: fictional, faulty disagreements are problematic in a way that the three other types of disagreements are not. In order to confront this intuition, I analyse what seems to be a perfect example of a fictional, faulty disagreement: the great beetle debate. The great beetle debate is a disagreement between two literary critics who hold incompatible readings of the first sentence of the Metamorphosis: this controversy was started by Nabokov in teaching a course on Kafka at Cornell in the 50s.

I pursue two lines of analysis: taken for granted that the great beetle debate is fictional, I argue that it is certainly faultless. This line of thinking ends up in taking stocks about a more general problem about the possibility of co-reference using empty singular terms: how is it possible to co-refer using singular terms having no referent? (Fictional terms are generally thought of as a special case of empty terms.) The great beetle debate, if fictional, essentially involves a fictional term. If faultless to boot, what is happening is, arguably, that the two parties do not refer to the same Gregor, which is counterintuitive. I think this line of analysis puts the debate in the position of being a crucial test for solutions to this more general philosophical problem.

On the other hand: taken for granted that the great beetle debate is faulty, I try and argue that it is most probably not fictional. This line of thinking ends up speculating about the nature of the norms involved in reading fictions, the rules for the reader’s imagination. I argue that these norms are, in principle, understandable as a constitutive part of the work of fiction. Hence, these norms are not fictional. So the great beetle debate, if faulty, is parasitic on a real disagreement about how one should read Kafka’s text.

This twofold analysis of the great beetle debate as a complex form of disagreement sheds interesting new lights on the traditional problems concerning “truth in fiction” (we should
rather say, following Walton 1990, the fictional: “truth in fiction” not being a kind of truth, the expression is somewhat misleading). As the great beetle debate shows, when it comes to determine what is fictional, the devil is in the details. The great beetle debate shows that what is fictional, ultimately, has to be relative to a reader’s capacity and willingness to imagine. This view I call pluralism, according to which some fictional events are left for the reader’s free choice to imagine. This view about fictionality is to be contrasted with relativism and absolutism. Relativism is the view that all fictional events are relative to a reader’s free choice of interpretation; it is false given many examples of mistaken readings. Absolutism is the view that none of the fictional events are relative to a reader’s free of interpretation; I think it is false, the great beetle debate as I analyse it being a good argument against it. Pluralism, simply put, says that the semantic content of a fiction depends on the reader to a certain extent. Pluralism of interpretation, I contend, is a hallmark of the fictional as opposed to the non-fictional.

I end up with some nice consequences of the view. Pluralism explains the possibility of the well-known phenomena of imaginative resistance in a unified way: if what is fictional depends to a reader’s capacity and willingness to imagine some details of the work, then there are two natural kinds of imaginative resistance always available in reading fiction. Unwillingness to imagine corresponds to the paradigmatic “moral” imaginative resistance as described from Walton 1994 to Gendler and Liao 2016; incapacity to imagine corresponds to the odd “descriptive” imaginative resistance as described in Yablo 2002. This finally leads me to reconsider the great beetle debate as an odd descriptive case of imaginative resistance. Following a pattern of inference discovered in Altshuler and Maier 2018, I draw some inferences about the possible narrators of the Metamorphosis.

References:

− Altshuler and Maier 2018 Death on the Freeway: Imaginative resistance as narrator accommodation.
− Stojanovic 2017 Context and Disagreement.
− Walton 1990 Mimesis as Make-Believe.
Fictions and Derived Contexts

Andreas Stokke

1 Introduction

In the tradition from Stalnaker (1999 [1970]), (1999 [1988]), (1999 [1998]), (2002), (2014) a discourse is seen as proceeding against a background of contextually shared information, called the common ground of the conversation, that is, the information taken for granted by the participants. The common ground of a conversation plays two main roles. On the one hand, utterances have the goal of adding to, or updating, the shared background information. Call this the storage role of common ground. On the other hand, common ground information is used to support various context-sensitive aspects of utterances. Call this the support role of common ground.

This paper explores the idea that discourses often rely on more than one type of background information. In many cases, discourses take place in the setting of more than one common ground. Specifically, I argue that various forms of fictions can be understood as interacting with such alternative common grounds both as storage and support. I consider two types. First, the familiar kind of fictions found in novels, movies, plays, and so on. Second, I consider some ways in which speakers sometimes use fictional scenarios for non-fictional purposes in factual conversations.

2 Derived Contexts

Stalnaker (1999 [1988]), (2014), Heim (1992), and others, have proposed that a range of embedding phenomena – including conditionals and attitude ascriptions – be analyzed in terms of derived, or local, contexts.

Familiarly, we can represent common ground information as a set of possible worlds, called the context set, comprising the set of possible worlds compatible with it – formally, the set of worlds w such that for each proposition p in the common ground, p is true at w. Given this, the support role of common ground extends to providing a set of worlds that propositions distinguish between.

An embedding construction like a believes that p expresses a proposition, say b, that depends on the embedded proposition p. But since what a believes might depart from what the speaker and other participants take for granted, p is seen as distinguishing between a set of worlds that is disjoint from the basic common ground.
3 Fictions

In this paper I argue that some forms of fictional discourse are plausibly seen as likewise interacting with some forms of derived contexts. First, I argue that, during the telling or hearing or watching of a fictional story, a derived, or subordinate, context develops in a way similar to how basic common ground information evolves during ordinary conversations. This fictional common ground plays both a storage and a support role. In particular, information that is taken to be part of the story can be used to support presuppositions.

Second, I argue that certain ways in which speakers sometimes use fictional scenarios for non-fictional purposes can be understood in this framework. For example, when explaining the beliefs of strict Calvinists, one might say,

(1) You and I are just fallen beings, predestined by God for salvation or eternal damnation.

I will argue that utterances like (1) are proposals to update derived contexts, in this case representing the beliefs of the strict Calvinists. In turn, such derived contexts can support subsequent utterances – e.g., one can felicitously presuppose the information it includes.

I will show that this kind of derived context can interact with the basic common ground in that information can be exported to be included in the official common ground information. Crudely, participants might export from the derived context associated with (1) that the strict Calvinists believed in predestination. This explains how fictional scenarios can be used for non-fictional purposes.

Moreover, I present data to show that fictional derived contexts, of both kinds, sometimes play the support role for utterances that are proposed as updates of basic common ground information, and vice versa. The conclusion will be that, in many cases, discourses fluently navigate between more than one kind of background information with the purpose of facilitating communication.

References

Knowledge ascriptions, fiction, and the historical present
Guiseppe Spolaore

Moore’s paradox is usually presented in connection with statements like:

(1) It’s raining, but I don’t believe/know that it’s raining.

What is special about these claims is that they sound absurd even though they are coherent and possibly true. Let us call them Moore-paradoxical statements.

It is commonly held that Moore-paradoxical sentences are assertable in no context whatsoever. In the talk I show that this idea is actually false: it is easy to cook up linguistic contexts in which (1) is assertable. Moreover, I present and discuss a problem involving self-knowledge reports about fiction. I argue that this problem is to be dealt with in analogy with a natural treatment of the historical present, that is, by exploiting a double-context semantics.

1. A ‘counter-example’ to Moore’s paradox

Tenses play a key role in Moore’s paradox. E.g., the past-tensed version of (1):

(1′) It was raining, but I didn’t believe/know that it was raining,

is perfectly sensible. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the standard examples of Moore-paradoxical statements all involve present-tensed sentences. However, it is well known that there exist present-tensed discourses that actually concern past events or states. These include the narrations in the (so-called) historical present. Here is an example, which I borrow from [4]:

(2) Fifty eight years ago to this day, on January 22, 1944, just as the Americans are about to invade Europe, the Germans attack Vercors.

Clearly, this present-tensed statement conveys essentially the same content as “Fifty eight years ago to this day, on January 22, 1944, just as the Americans were about to invade Europe, the Germans attacked Vercors.” In light of this, it is hardly surprising that Moore-paradoxical statements can be perfectly assertible when embedded within narrations in the historical present. Here is one example.

(3) It’s July 23, 2012. I’m locked up in an underground dark room, with no holes or windows. It’s raining, but I don’t know that it’s raining.

2. Knowledge self-ascriptions and fictional truth

Suppose that, during a debate about Milos Forman’s movie Amadeus, I assert:

(4) Mozart’s Requiem was commissioned by Salieri.

Claims like (4), which are understood to be true in a work of fiction, are called fictive statements.\(^1\) According to a natural approach, fictive sentences call for a context shift: the world of the context is not to be identified with the world of use but with ‘the world of the story’ (see [3]). There are different ways to make sense of the notion of world of a story. In accordance with a recent proposal [omissis], I shall equate a world of a story with a fictional setting, defined as a function from possible worlds to propositions – intuitively, the propositions that are true in the story relative to that world. In any event, if the context-shift view is adopted, then (4) turns out to be true simpliciter, for it is clearly true relative to the relevant ‘world of the story’. It is thus far from mysterious that I can feel entitled to assert it.

\(^{1}\)It is worth noting that also fictive statements can give raise to ‘counter-examples’ to Moore’s paradox. E.g., I can use statement (1) during a debate about narration (3), assuming (3) is a piece of fiction about me.
There is a problem, though. Moorean considerations suggest that, if (5) is assertable by me in a context, then also the following is:

(5) I know that Mozart’s Requiem was commissioned by Salieri.

Unfortunately, it is very dubious that the word-shift approach can be extended to (5). Firstly, because there is no guarantee that I exist in the world of Amadeus. Secondly, because (5) intuitively entails that I know something in the actual world and not just in some fictional world. These problems motivate the quest for alternative treatments.2

3. Knowledge self-ascriptions and the historical present

In this section, I argue that there is a close analogy between knowledge self-ascriptions like (5) and certain knowledge ascriptions involving the historical present. My proposal is to extend to the former ones a natural semantic analysis of the latter ones.

There are good reasons to think that a Kaplan-style semantic analysis of narrations in the historical present requires two contexts, one representing the (typically present) situation in which the story is told, the other representing the (typically past) situation the narration is about; Schlenker [4] calls them context of thought and context of utterance, respectively. E.g., in the case of (2), the context of thought \( c_t \) involves (possibly among other things) the actual world and the present time (in 2018), while the context of utterance \( c_u \) involves the actual world and a certain non-present time (in 1944). Indexical expressions such as “now” and “this day” tend to be sensitive to the context of thought, whereas the historical present tends to be sensitive to the context of utterance. Thus, e.g., in (2) “this day” picks up the day of the time of \( c_t \) (in 2018), while the present tense is relative to the time of \( c_u \) (in 1944). Now let us consider:

(6) It’s August 1914. Many German soldiers believe they are sent to a blitzkrieg. But now we know that they are wrong, and that a long, long war is forthcoming.

The italicized knowledge ascription at the end of (6) (in its more natural understanding) concerns our present (in 2018) epistemic situation. However, interestingly, the historical present tense in the complement sentence is relative to a past time (in 1914). Within a double-context semantics, it is possible to provide adequate truth-conditions for such intricate statement. Assuming a Hintikka-style approach to knowledge ascriptions, we can say (very roughly) that the statement is true relative to \( (c_t, c_u) \) iff, in all the worlds compatible with what we know at the time of \( c_t \), the embedded sentence is true at the time of \( c_u \).

In the talk, I argue that nonfictive knowledge ascriptions that, like (5), involve fictive statements in the complement are to be dealt with by appeal to a double context, in analogy with the above treatment of (6). This time, we can distinguish between a real context \( c_r \) and a fictional context \( c_f \). Simply put, sentence (5) is true in \( (c_r, c_f) \) iff, in all the worlds compatible with what I know in the world of \( c_r \) (viz., in the actual world), the embedded sentence is true in the fictional setting of \( c_f \) (viz. in the ‘world of the story’).3 This solution can be extended to other problems involving fictive statements and factive constructions, such as the ones discussed in [1, §3.1].

References


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2In the talk, I briefly discuss another natural approach to fictive statements and to sentences like (5), which appeals to a covert “in fiction” operator (see [2]).

3This solution requires that one same story can have different contents relative to different epistemic alternatives. I take this requirement to be very plausible within a Hintikka-style epistemic logic, as it just boils down to the platitude that people can have partial knowledge of the content of a story, or even no knowledge at all.
Elsi Kaiser et al.

Sensory effects on perspective shifting: An experimental investigation of visual, olfactory and gustatory perception in fictional narrative

Perspective-taking is fundamental to processing narrative fiction. There exists a range of subjective adjectives (e.g. *fun, tasty, amazing*) that reflect evaluative attitudes in a perspective-sensitive way. To understand these adjectives, one needs to know whose opinion is conveyed, who is the subjective anchor/`judge`? Whose perspective does the adjective refer to? These questions are especially significant for understanding how readers process fiction, due to the potential availability of multiple attitude-holders. The possibility of shifting from the speaker`s/narrator`s point-of-view to the point-of-view of a character (e.g. in free indirect discourse) is arguably one of the hallmarks of fictional narrative.

The perspective-sensitive evaluation is fundamental to human cognition (Markus/Zajonc 1985), so it is not surprising that there exists a range of subjective linguistic expressions, including predicates of personal taste like *fun, tasty, disgusting, amazing* that reflect evaluative attitudes. To understand these expressions, one needs to know whose opinion/attitude is being conveyed, i.e., who is the `subjective anchor/evaluator/judge` that the expression is relativized to. Although subjective adjectives have received considerable attention in theoretical semantics, to the best of our knowledge, current semantic theories do not make distinctions based on *sensory modality* (e.g. *sight, sound, taste, smell, touch*). Thus, ex(1) would presumably be analyzed the same way whether it refers to the taste, smell or visual appearance of a pizza slice, for example. (But see McNally/Stojanovic 2017 on aesthetic predicates like *beautiful*.)

However, from a broader perspective, it is well-known that the *five senses are fundamentally different*, not only in their biological but also their social-communicative aspects. For example, *sight* is commonly viewed as the dominant sense in most (if not all) human cultures and languages (e.g. San Roque et al. 2015, but Aikhenvald/Storch 2013). The primacy of vision may stem from the fact that the visual modality conveys information that often involves *shared perceptual experiences* between people (San Roque et al. 2015, Moore/Dunham 1995) and is also often viewed as providing relatively *objective* information: Sweetser claims that vision is “our primary source of objective data about the world” (1990:39). Not surprisingly, visual evidence is often considered as more reliable than auditory or other kinds of evidence, for example in evidentiality systems.

Near the other end of the scale, the gustatory modality (*taste*) is regarded as highly subjective and variable across people (Sweetser 1990, Chafe & Nichols 1986, Dubois 2007, Viberg 1984). In contrast to the visual domain (where a person A will tend to assume that she has roughly the same visual experience as person B when they focus their visual attention on the same thing), in the taste domain A is less likely to assume that she has the same gustatory experience as B when they eat the same thing. These are not fixed rules, but prior work suggests there taste and sight differ in terms of how closely linked they are to a *person’s internal subjective experience that varies across individuals* (*taste*) vs. *an experience that tends to be more stable across different people/shared across people* (*sight*, Caballero & Paradis 2015).

Given the striking differences between sensory modalities, we conducted two studies to test whether interpretation of subjective evaluative adjectives (specifically, *predicates of personal taste*, PPTs) in fictional narratives depends on whether they refer to the *visual* vs. *olfactory* (smell) vs. *gustatory* (taste) domains. Does readers` interpretation of *who is the *subjective anchor*? (attitude holder, `judge`) of the adjective* depend on whether the situation in the narrative involves seeing, smelling or tasting? Crucially, our stimuli kept the adjectives constant while the verb was manipulated, as in ex.(2).

The sentence was specified by the verb, except for the baseline condition (2d), where it was underspecified. (*Hear* was not included due to difficulties creating items allowing both *taste* and *hear*.)

(2a) *[sight]* When I came into the room, Eliza saw the muffin on the platter. It looked disgusting.
(2b) *[smell]* When I came into the room, Eliza smelled the muffin on the platter. It smelled disgusting.
(2c) *[taste]* When I came into the room, Eliza tasted the muffin on the platter. It tasted disgusting.
(2d) *[baseline]* When I came into the room, Eliza put the muffin on the platter. It was disgusting.

(3) *Whose opinion is it that the muffin [looked/smelled/tasted] was} disgusting? The narrator`s / Eliza`s

Importantly, participants were explicitly instructed to read the texts as *fiction*, as *extracts from novels*. We wanted to make available both the perspectives/viewpoints of a 1st person narrator and a character in the fictional narrative. Indeed, on target items, the critical sequence was preceded by a clause mentioning the 1st person narrator by means of a 1st person pronoun. This makes available two possible candidates (narrator and character) for the *`whose opinion`* question after each target (ex.3) Participants`
answers indicate who they think is the anchor/evaluator/attitude-holder of the adjective. (We also tested variants where the preamble mentions the 3rd person character rather than the 1st person narrator, *When she came into the room*, but those are not relevant here as they do not introduce another referent.)

Are there differences between senses? The key question is whether the sensory modality influences who participants interpret as the attitude holder of the subjective adjective. To the best of our knowledge, current theories are silent on this matter. If we find differences between senses, how can these be captured in theories of evaluativity? In recent work, Kennedy & Willer (2016:17) argue that subjectivity is a highly context-sensitive, pragmatic phenomenon that “is not to be explained strictly in terms of any particular semantic parameter, implicit argument, or lexical underspecification.” This view contrasts with many competing accounts (e.g. Lasersohn 2005/judge parameter, Bylinina 2014/implicit arguments), but would allow us to explain potential sensory modality effects without having to complicate the lexical entries of the adjectives themselves.

Exploratory question: What kinds of differences are predicted? In (2a) and (2c), Eliza is the subject of ‘saw’ and ‘tasted.’ Given that gustatory experiences in general involve a person’s internal subjective experience and are variable across individuals, we predict Eliza will be interpreted as the attitude holder in (2c). However, as visual experiences often involve shared perceptual experiences and tend to be more stable/consistent across individuals, the first-person narrator may also be interpreted as the attitude holder in (2a). Thus, if the attitude-holder identification process with evaluative adjectives is sensitive to the sensory information on the verb, we may see more narrator responses with see than taste. The predictions for smell are unclear: It involves more shared perceptual experiences than taste but is intuitively less constant across individuals than see.

In Exp1, native English speakers (n=56) read sentences like (2) (24 targets, 42 fillers) and answered questions like (3). Exp2 (n=56 new people) was similar, but adjectives were modified by intensifiers (e.g. totally delightful, absolutely amazing). If intensifiers strengthen a speaker’s commitment to the utterance (e.g. Beltrama 2017), we may see more 1st-person narrator responses when shared perceptual experiences are possible.

The results for Exp1-2 are very similar. Both baseline conditions show a default speaker-orientation (expected). Statistical analyses (lmer, R) show that the baseline and see conditions do not differ from each other (p’s>.2) in either experiment. However, the rate of character opinion responses is higher (and the rate of narrator responses lower) in the smell and taste conditions than the see conditions (p’s<.003) or the baseline condition (p’s<.001) in both studies. We also find intensification effects: Although smell and taste do not differ in Exp1, taste elicits more character responses Exp2 than smell (p<.003), which has more narrator responses. Indeed, the rate of narrator responses with smell and see is higher in Exp2 than Exp1 (smell: p<.05, see: p=.052, marginal). This suggests intensification can boost the likelihood of the first-person narrator being interpreted as the attitude holder, at least in some modalities.

We are finishing a follow-up experiment (Exp3) where participants had the option of indicating if they feel that a certain opinion is shared by both character and narrator (i.e., narrator’s opinion, Eliza’s opinion, or both the narrator and Eliza have this opinion). This addresses important questions regarding the sharing of perspectives/subjective opinions in fiction, and the relation between narrator and character.

In sum, we provide new evidence that sensory modality has a significant impact on the process of identifying the attitude-holder of subjective adjectives in fiction: There are more 1st person narrator responses with see than taste or smell. We found clear differences between seeing vs. tasting/smelling—although we used overly simple, impoverished ‘textoid’-type fragments. An important future direction is the use of longer, naturalistic fictional narratives. We are also investigating the interaction of sensory modality and free indirect discourse. As a whole, our results suggest perspective-sensitivity is highly context-dependent (Kennedy/Willer 2016). The modality effect align with the biological and social properties of sight, taste and smell.
Pragmatic presupposition across fiction and non-fiction

Tatyana Skrebtsova

The paper deals with the notion of pragmatic presupposition as applied to different types of discourse ranging from everyday conversation to mass media to academic discourse and fiction. The notion of pragmatic presupposition allowing for a number of interpretations, we select one that is compatible with discourse, rather than sentence, analysis. Pragmatic presupposition can be defined, then, “in terms of assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge” [Givón 1979: 50]. We opt for a broad construal of the notion that is able to account for manifold information that will be accepted as given and easily integrated into the hearer’s representation of the context.

In what follows we attempt to look at the way pragmatic presuppositions influence our perception of texts across different styles, genres and domains. What is the nature of pragmatic presupposition to be found in different text types? Are there any texts with no underlying pragmatic presuppositions whatsoever? What texts are likely to rely most heavily on pragmatic presuppositions as defined above and which ones are less affected by this factor? Does the notion of pragmatic presupposition make sense when applied to fiction and, if yes, in what respects is it special? Does it matter what fiction genre we are considering? Etc.

In general, it can be said that non-fiction varies greatly in the role and scope of pragmatic presuppositions as well as their validity and acceptability. In ordinary conversation, pragmatic presuppositions are ubiquitous, and it is no accident that the research normally draws upon this kind of data. It might be claimed that purely informative genres (like railway station announcements), on the contrary, are intended to be maximally explicit and unambiguous and thus leave little room for pragmatic presuppositions. This is not the case, however, with the official documents and legal texts, since understanding formal language requires special skills and practice, and the hearer often fails to accommodate new information. In academic discourse, the role of pragmatic presuppositions may be thought to be rather insignificant, as the hearer/reader is most likely to be a specialist in the field and thus share the background information. Moreover, the very nature of scholarly reasoning, arguing, inferring, summarizing, etc. is supposed to be consistent and thorough. However, theoretical prerequisites of a study may well be contended by the hearer, which actually means rejection of the speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions about the common ground. In mass-media and political discourse, presupposed information is extensive and diverse, accounting for both general knowledge, social attitudes, norms, values, etc.

Now, if we turn to literary fiction, the notion of pragmatic presupposition becomes much more vague and may be thought irrelevant. Indeed, the author constructs a fictional world and
the reader is expected to imagine it and hold it to be “true” in all its totality. Challenging the story would be out of place (as contrasted with the non-fiction). This seems to make the notion redundant.

Yet there are fiction genres in which the idea of pragmatic presupposition may prove useful. One is absurdist literature, with its irrational characters, distortions of time and place, inconsistent plot structure and incoherent narration. Reading the absurd, one is constantly confronted with the apparent non-textuality and violated expectations, so that the naive reader might question the narrative’s purpose as well as the validity of particular acts and story in general and, by so doing, actually challenge the author’s pragmatic presuppositions. Coherence and acceptability as text criteria apply to all sorts of texts, and in this respect there is no difference between fiction and non-fiction.

Another clear case is unreliable narrator, to be found, in particular, in detective fiction. Apart from the famous novel “The Murder of Roger Ackroyd” by Agatha Christie, a few examples can be drawn to demonstrate the effect of the readers’ trust in the narrator’s faithfulness. Detective fiction is opposed to other literary genres in that the reader, eager to solve the mystery, is supposed to be suspicious about almost everything being said. However, it turns out that the narrator’s words (even in the 3rd person narration) have a special status for the readers. Narrator is being construed as an objective outside observer and the readers never hesitate to trust him/her, in stark opposition to the characters’ words. Skillful detective writers know how to take advantage of the fact. The crucial thing, the core of the mystery may be a wrong name, gender, appearance or other characteristics communicated by the narrator. It never occurs to the reader to challenge such information, exactly because it pertains to the author’s well-calculated pragmatic presuppositions. It should be stressed that such information plays no part outside the detective genre, e.g. there is no point in doubting the identity of Anna Karenina, etc.

Summing up, pragmatic presupposition is almost omnipresent in non-fiction, but can be found in fiction, too. Akin to other pragmatic aspects of language, it often remains unnoticed, but comes to light in case of communication failures, such as text incomprehensibility or oddness, misunderstanding, disagreement or mischievous, unreliable speaker.

References
Temporal relations in Free Indirect Discourse interpreted within a Prominence-based temporal model

Free Indirect Discourse (FID) is a means to present the thought of a prominent discourse referent (cf. Hinterwimmer 2017). It is integrated in a text in a dual manner, thus differing from canonical direct speech. According to Banfield (1982) and others, in free indirect discourse most deictic elements referentially depend upon the context attributed to the protagonist. By contrast, tense is interpreted relative to the external perspective, i.e., the speaker’s origo (cf. ib.). Although this is quite accepted in the literature, it has to be highlighted that, e.g., in the Romance languages, the generalization only holds in purely referential terms but not in what concerns tense choice. For example in French, a past reference would also be maintained in FID, i.e., tense would be set relative to the speaker’s now. However, the specific tense choice is not independent of FID as there is a strong preference for the imperfective tense (*imparfait*) while the perfective counterpart *passé simple* seems to be excluded or is at least very rare (cf. Vetters 1994: 215 ss.). In the talk, we do not focus on tense choice (cf. ib., Eckardt 2015: 88 ff. etc.). The questions we intend to address are: how does narrative time behave in FID and what temporal relations hold with respect to the surrounding context?¹

In the interpretation of narrative time in FID, several factors play a role and they apply on different levels, which, in turn, have to be considered together. To our knowledge, this has not been done yet. We also expect that this new perspective poses problems to traditional tense models. Our prominence-based temporal model (cf. Author1 / Author2 submitted), by contrast, is able to grasp the different factors at stake and can therefore solve the puzzle. The relevant factors are, first, temporal relations including features of (sub-)event structure, conceptual relations and temporal distance, second, rhetorical relations and third, temporal perspective. In what follows, we introduce them step by step and outline how they interrelate.

Common discourse descriptions model narrative time on the basis of the reference time (*R*) (cf., e.g., Hinrichs 1986, Kamp / Rohrer 1983, Partee 1984). In narrative discourse, when events are presented in sequence, *R* is said to advance, and to be maintained in the case of, e.g., concurrent states (cf. ib.). Still, the question that seems not to have been dealt with is, what happens to *R* in FID? Is *R* updated or is a previously set *R* simply maintained? To give an answer, we will begin by comparing the time to be attributed to a sentence of FID with the precedingly introduced *R*.²

There are three different (non-distant) temporal relations. Eckard (2015) considers the first one: An “event of thinking takes place at the time *R* where the story currently takes place” (ib.: 99, italics are hers). In her view, FID does not update time by itself. This is the case in (1). By contrast, Hinterwimmer (2017: 12) shows that an update is possible (see (2)).³

(1) *Il annonça sa décision. Il allait se marier.* (‘He announced his decision. He was going to get married.’) (Vetters 1994: 179)

(2) *Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. She bumped into him head-on. Angrily, she smacked her in the face with his bag. Ouch, how that hurt!* (Hinterwimmer 2017: 10)

¹ Due to lack of space, in the abstract, we focus purely on the relations to the preceding discourse.
² The important right border, i.e., the sentence after the FID sentence brings additional evidence. We ignore it here to make our presentation clearer.
³ Still, as Eckard’s (2015) interpretation of *R* is oriented in line with Hinrichs (1986) and Partee (1984) and not in the sense of Kamp and colleagues (cf., for a comparison of the two lines of research, Author1 / Author2 submitted, with further references), she is able to grasp also example (2). She makes strong reference to aspect and aktionsart. From our point of view, her approach blurs the line between narrative time and event time (cf. ib.).
In example (1), the FID sentence, so to speak, makes more precise what the verb *annonça* (‘announced’) expresses. Therefore, the temporal reference of both sentences is the same. In (2), however, the events of smacking and of thinking cannot hold at the same time. Rather, the thought is a reaction to the smacking and, due to what we know about experiential and mental properties of humans, has to be realized at a (slightly) later point in time. Thus, in (2), reference time is updated in the FID sentence. Still, as the following example shows, R may also be shifted to an anterior point in time.

(3) *Mary smiled. How smart she was, so much smarter than all those amateurs!* (Hinterwimmer 2017: 3)

In (3), the reference time of the FID sentence is updated to a time directly before the R of the event expressed in the first sentence as the FID sentence expresses the reason for the smiling event.

The three examples we have seen so far show three different temporal interrelations. However, they have three properties in common: (i) The verbs in the respective preceding sentences are all telic or ingressive, i.e., they involve a change of an expressed situation. (ii) The reference times of the FID sentences stand in a direct relation to the ones of the sentences preceding them. (iii) The FID sentences all show a rather clear-cut rhetorical relation to the preceding sentence (cf. Lascarides / Asher 1993). In example (1) it is an elaboration relation, in (2) and (3) there are inverse causal relations, i.e., of result and reason, respectively.

In the examples, only the third factor, the type of rhetorical relation, is manipulated. Still, there are also examples in which the first factor becomes relevant, i.e., aktionsart. Telicity and temporal extension are to be highlighted. The second property, direct temporal relation, plays a slightly different role as it seems to be a prerequisite for the availability of the rhetorical relations. When it does not hold, another powerful factor comes into play, which we consider in our model (cf. Author1 / Author2 submitted), namely, temporal perspective. This is shown in the following example.

(4) *Friedemann saß neben der Tänzerin. Wie sie ihn angesehen hatte!* (Eckardt 2015: 88)

In (4), the FID sentence again shifts the reference to a time before the one of the preceding sentence. But the explanations given above do not hold as there is no direct temporal relation and no discourse relation becomes apparent. Rather, it is the temporal perspective that fills the interpretational gap. As it is marked by the past perfect, the FID sentence is presented under a backward-looking perspective thus locating the reference time of the FID sentence before the one of the preceding sentence.

Bibliography
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Common pretence
Bart Geurts & Huub Vromen

Pretend play is a universal in human development that appears in the second year of life, reaches its peak between ages three and five, and is associated with a variety of social and cognitive skills (Lillard et al. 2011, Weisberg 2015). It is usually seen as an unserious activity that most of us outgrow in due course, and rightly so. We disagree. In our view, pretence is a common activity that is indispensable for many of our dealings with the real world. This is not to say that pretence and reality cannot be separated, but it is to say that their interplay is even more intricate than is generally thought.

Some examples:

1. The fictitious companions that many young children pretend to interact with often become part of the household, at least up to a point. For instance, they may be given a place at the breakfast table, which is not supposed to be taken by others.

2. When said in July, “Let’s pretend it’s Christmas”, may constrain our plans for the day in various ways. We may decide to cook a traditional Christmas dinner, for example, and that will be a real dinner with real washing-up to do afterwards.

3. “From Antwerp to Brussels it’s 40 minutes by train.” This is not an exact measurement, and we know it isn’t, but still we are perfectly happy to pretend that 40 minutes is the exact travel time, and use that figure in our real-world calculations.

All these cases involve a form of pretence that is entangled with real-world activities, and although the first two scenarios may be somewhat special, the third type of case is quite common.

It seems to us that, in order to account for these observations, we need a theory that treats communication as continuous with other forms of social interaction. The theory we have in mind views communication as commitment making (Brandom 1994, Krifka 2015, Geurts 2017, 2018). Commitments enable agents to coordinate their actions; that’s what they are for. If Fred tells Wilma that he will do the dishes, his promise to her enables them to coordinate their actions: Fred is now committed to do the dishes, and by the same token, Wilma is now entitled to plan her activities on the assumption that Fred will do the dishes.

Commitment is a three-place relation $C$ between two agents $x$ and $y$ and a propositional content $\varphi$. $C_{xy}\varphi$ is to be read as “$x$ is committed to $y$ to act on $\varphi$”, where “acting on” comprises both linguistic and non-linguistic acts. $C_{xy}\varphi$ entails neither that $\varphi$ is true nor that $x$ or $y$ believe $\varphi$ to be true. Commitments are normative facts: if $C_{xy}\varphi$, then $x$ must act on $\varphi$, and $y$ is entitled to act on the premiss that $x$ will act on $\varphi$. Geurts (2018) argues that all speech acts cause commitments of the form $C_{ab}\varphi$, where $a$ is the speaker and $b$ is hearer. Distinctions between major speech act types correspond to differences in the type of propositional content the speaker becomes committed to. For example, if $a$ promises $b$ to do $\varphi$, then $a$’s commitment is telic if $a$ must see to it that $\varphi$ is true, and otherwise it is atelic.
We can think of $C_{ab}$ and $C_{ba}$ as modal operators whose logic is KD4!, i.e. a normal modal logic in which $C_{xy} \varphi \rightarrow \neg C_{xy} \neg \varphi$ and $C_{xy} \varphi \leftrightarrow C_{xy} C_{xy} \varphi$. Furthermore, $C_{ab}$ and $C_{ba}$ are linked by the Acceptance axiom: $C_{xy} \varphi \rightarrow C_{yx} C_{xy} \varphi$. Informally, this is to say that $x$ has no commitment to $y$ that is not acknowledged by $y$, be it openly or implicitly. Common ground is defined in terms of mutual commitment: $x$ and $y$ are mutually committed to act on $\varphi$ iff $C_{xy} \varphi$, $C_{yx} C_{xy} \varphi$, $C_{yx} C_{yx} \varphi$, etc., or $C_{xy} \varphi$ for short. Courtesy of the Acceptance axiom, if agents share a commitment to $\varphi$, they are mutually committed to act on $\varphi$: shared commitments are eo ipso common ground.

Being committed to act on $\varphi$ generally does not imply that all one’s actions must accord with $\varphi$. My promise to do the dishes does not commit me to do the dishes if the house is on fire, and likewise, my stating that Juventus will win the Champions League does not commit me to the truth of “Juventus will win the Champions League” if all its star players transfer to other clubs. Hence, commitments are typically restricted to a bounded sphere of possible circumstances, and commitment spheres vary from case to case. The commitments created by acts of pretence are no exception to this rule.

So let’s think of the commitments between $a$ and $b$ as defined by means of a family of operator pairs, $C_{ab}$ and $C_{ba}$ (which represent “real” commitments), and further $C’_{ab}$ and $C’_{ba}$, $C’’_{ab}$ and $C’’_{ba}$, etc. (which represent “pretend” commitments). Suppose that Alice tells Bruce: “From Antwerp to Brussels it’s 40 minutes by train.” Then Alice’s statement creates a twofold commitment: $C_{ab} p$ and $C_{ab} C’_{ab} p$, where $p$ denotes the proposition that from Antwerp to Brussels it’s exactly 40 minutes by train. If Bruce agrees with Alice, he comes to share her commitments: $C_{ba} p$ and $C_{ba} C’_{ba} p$; hence, $C’_{ab} p$ and $C’_{ba} C’_{ab} p$. These common grounds are restricted to different commitment spheres: $C’_{ab} C’_{ab} p$ is “for real”, $C’’_{ab} p$ is “just pretence”. Nevertheless, the second set of commitments support Alice’s and Bruce’s actions in the first sphere. In particular, they license them to do their calculations with the number 40. On this view, relations between commitment spheres are non-uniform: the ways in which Alice and Bruce’s pretend commitment affects their real-world actions is obviously different from the real-world import of the pretend commitment that today is Christmas or the pretend commitment that our household has an imperceptible member.

There is a family resemblance between the proposed account and theories that partition the common ground in order to deal with fiction (e.g., Semeijn 2017). But there important differences as well. For instance, our account is not restricted to assertions, but applies to illocutionary acts across the board.

Non-conniving mixed contexts

Much has been written on the truth-conditions of statements containing fictional names. Less on how such statements manage to convey information from speaker to audience, and get an addressee to accept it as veridical information, about what the speaker specifically has in mind when using a particular fictional name. An interesting type of context highlights interesting features of communication with fictional names: non-conniving, assertive, mixed context (NAM). This is a type of context where participants talk about fictional individuals without presupposing that such individuals exist, while simultaneously representing the 'fictional worlds' they are typically associated with. Thus consider:

(1) Sherlock Holmes does not exist; he is a fictional detective.
(2) I don't know that King Arthur exists; but he is known for his heroic deeds against the Saxon invaders in post-Roman Britain.
(3) If the Yeti exists, then it is among the hairiest creatures ever.

Typically (1-3) are uttered in a NAM, defined as follows:

**Nc** The participants use fictional names in a non-conniving sense, i.e. they do not believe that the names refer / that their referents exist.

**As** The uses of the fictional names constitute assertions that usually conform with Gricean maxims.

**Mix** The statements are governed both by an intention to report on the 'content' of the fiction and to report on actual states-of-affairs involving that content.

In NAMs the 'slate of commitments' of the participants, in the sense of Geurts (1997), are few. Neither the speaker or addressee is committed to there being an individual that is the bearer of the fictional name, or equivalently, that the use of the name in the statement refers. More importantly, neither is committed to ascribing the other those very commitments, as (2) and (3) suggest. Indeed, the epistemic modal in (2) and the conditional construction of (3) explicitly prevent the two italicized presuppositions from projecting. However, the assertions of (1-3) can succeed only if the addressee gets to know which fictional individual the speaker meant to talk about, by using the relevant fictional name. This, in turn, is key for explaining the semantic intuitions – if any – that the statements will elicit in the addressee. While the slate of commitments of participants in NAM typically exclude these two presuppositions, they must include a piece of information – in part linguistically encoded – which provides the means for identifying the subject-matter of these utterances in context.

Buck-passing naming presuppositions

The main point of my talk is to suggest that we need a special type of presuppositions to make sense of how communication can succeed with fictional names – 'buck-passing' naming presuppositions (BPP). I claim that these enter the common ground of participants to fill the gap left by the absence of existential / referential presuppositions, so as to allow speakers and addressees to have a common interpretation of the speaker’s use of a fictional name. A BPP has three features:

**Deferential** It defers the interpretation of the occurrence of a name by which it is triggered to the event or sequence of events involving an act of grounding, sincere or pretended, that name in a referent, whether successful or not.

**Token-reflexive** It performs its deferential function in a token-reflexive manner, by pointing to whatever event or sequence of event involving uses of the same name.

**Conditional** It is conditional in that it represents a conditional commitment from the speaker, i.e. the speaker is conditionally committed to being referring to the individual, if any, that would be the referent of the name if the relevant grounding(s) involved a relation to an actual individual.
I assume that BPPs are normally triggered by names, whether fictional or ordinary. So for every name NN, the associated naming presupposition depends on a relation between occurrences: an occurrence of the name used in a particular utterance; and an event or sequence of events involving a grounding of that name. But that relation, of course, is not what the presupposition consists in. BPPs can thus be viewed as a piece of information constraining the interpretation of the occurrence of the name used, so that it is assigned the individual, if any, that is referred to in the grounding event. Formally this makes BPPs conditions on the assignment of the occurrence of their trigger: the assignment function is constrained to return the same value, if any, as the sequence of anchoring functions – in the sense of Hunter (2014) – of whatever intentional act(s) involved in the relevant grounding event(s), should each of these anchoring function(s) be defined for that grounding event. Roughly:

**Buck-passing naming presuppositions** For any utterance u of a sentence S containing an occurrence nn of proper name NN, a representation of the semantic function of nn is constrained by the following presupposition: its object-argument is assigned the value returned by any anchoring functions of the representations involved in some sequence of grounding events G = <e1, e2, ...en> on the condition that, in all these events, the agent performing the grounding pretends or believes to bear an epistemic relation to some feature of the situation such that this relation distinguishes an individual as the referent of NN in virtue of being the referent of her beliefs or episodes of pretense.

In short BPPs ensure that an addressee interpret the use of a name as if that it was grounded in a individual. The characterization is neutral on whether the addressee believes that the occurrence of the name refers at the actual world. More generally, the characterization entails no existential or referential commitment, and thus makes it intelligible how a conversation in a NAM-context can proceed unimpaired, without creating presuppositional failures that would be difficult to reconcile with the semantic intuitions of the participants.

**Beyond internal and fictional anchors**

The notion of BPPs as constraints on the representation of the semantic function of names can be viewed as a spin-off from the notion of internal anchors important to Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). It may improve on two aspects of the theory, however.

First, DRT typically represents statements containing names as Discourse Representation Structures (DRS) where the discourse referent(s) standing for the name used are bound by an *internal anchor*. That is, any utterance of a sentence of form ‘NN is F’ will be associated with a DRS of form < [ANCH, x]{x: ... F(x) ...}>, as in Kamp (2015). But according to the version of DRT under consideration, the semantic rule for internal anchors instructs the interpretation algorithm to assign internally anchored discourse referents to real-world individuals with which the speaker is related, i.e. via external anchors. The type of relation in question is both existence-entailing and existence-committing, to the effect that the DRS receives the same interpretation as if the speaker believed in the existence of a referent. But to say that the speaker or the addressee believes in the existence of a referent would be a violation of the principle captured in the non-committal aspect of NAMs (NC).

Second, amending the semantic rule for internal anchors so that the evaluation function look for values at worlds representing a weaker type of attitude, i.e. Stalnaker’s notion of acceptance, fails to capture the dependence on the actual world of names (fictional or ordinary). As Kripke and Salmon have argued, both fictional and ordinary names are rigid; the only difference is that ordinary names are rigid designators while fictional names are rigid nondesignators, see Salmon (2007): necessarily, they don’t designate anything, but had they designated something at the actual world (as per a successful grounding), then they would have designated the same thing at any world accessible to the actual world and different from the actual world at most from the fact that only in the actual world was the grounding unsuccessful. Even though Stalnaker’s notion of acceptance is not meant to capture rigidity, a possible-world implementation of a derivative notion of acceptance could ensure rigidity, perhaps along the lines of BPPs. But then it is not clear why we would need to introduce attitudes in the first place, as opposed to constraints on representations. For these representations may or may not be involved in particular attitudes – committal or non-committal – with respect to a referent. By the same token BPPs suggest that we might not need to choose between different ways of partitioning possible-worlds, to restrict the range of the evaluation function of anchored representations, corresponding to internal and fictitious anchors, i.e. fictitious anchors being restricted to resolve at worlds representing an agent’s pretense in the existence of a referent, see Recanati (2017).

**References**

1. Puzzle: Daniil Kharms’ absurdist discourses raise a puzzle for philosophical theories of artwork completion. Consider one of Kharms’ short texts, entitled “A Sonnet”, which begins as follows:

(1) An amazing thing happened to me today, I suddenly forgot what comes first - 7 or 8.

The discourse continues with the narrator seeking help from neighbors and a local grocer to no avail. It concludes when the narrator and the neighbors walk to the Summer Garden:

(2) We went to the Summer Garden and started counting trees. But reaching a six in count, we stopped and started arguing: In the opinion of some, a 7 went next; but in opinion of others an 8 did. We were arguing for a long time, when by some sheer luck, a child fell off a bench and broke both of his jaws. That distracted us from our argument. And then we all went home.

The discourse is coherent (in sense of Hobbs 1990), and yet there is a sense in which it is both complete and incomplete. One the one hand, (2) presents the final line of the discourse (nothing follows) and is thus complete, and yet a reader also feels that (2) is incomplete since the conflict (the narrator recognizing that 7 follows 6) is never resolved. How can we make sense of this? To answer this question, we critically examine several contemporary philosophic analyses of artwork completion which attempt to provide a single definition of “completion”. We argue that Kharms’ discourse challenges this methodology, proposing that there are two distinct notions of completion:

- For any object x and any artistic kind K, x is an intrinsically complete K iff x is an instance of K.
- A work of art is extrinsically complete iff the artist has acquired a completion disposition with respect to that work.

To motivate these definitions, we consider three theories of completeness that differ in considering the artwork’s intrinsic features versus its extrinsic features versus both its intrinsic and extrinsic features.

2. An intrinsic theory of artwork completion: According to Beardsley (1982), completeness is entirely an intrinsic feature of an artistic work, something about which the artist could possibly be wrong if she misjudged her own work. According to this view, which call this view Aestheticism, the intrinsic features that make a work complete are aesthetic in nature: unity, intensity, and complexity. Since Kharms’ discourse has no resolution of the noted conflict, a necessary condition for the constitution of a story (Labov & Waletzky 1967, Ochs & Capps 2001), it lacks the required complexity to be an intrinsically complete story. The lack of complexity, however, is not due to a misjudgment on Kharms’ part. Quite the opposite, Kharms purposefully wrote an intrinsically incomplete story; to show that art is derived from a violation of conventional story telling (Yankelevich 2009). And he was successful in doing so. Aestheticism, therefore, fails to account for the intuitive completeness of Kharms’ discourse since it does not take into account extrinsic features of artistic work, e.g. the received public view or the creative intents of the author.

3. Extrinsic theories of artwork completion: A view that, instead, says completeness is an extrinsic feature of an artistic work is attributable to Hick (2008). We’ll call this view Publicism; provided no explicit declaration by the artist to the contrary, a work of art is complete if it has been published with the artist’s consent. Publicism gives merely a sufficient condition for completeness. Here is one way to provide necessary and sufficient conditions (call this view Publicism+): provided there is no explicit declaration by the artist to the contrary, an artwork is complete iff it has been published with the artist’s consent and appreciated as complete by a public audience. Note, however, that it is not in virtue of being published that a work is complete. Kharms’ discourse was censored in the Soviet times and it would be bizarre to conclude that it was incomplete during this period, but later became complete when it was published.

Another view that streamlines extrinsic features is Psychologism: a work of art is finished iff the artist has acquired a completion disposition with respect to that work. Trogdon and Livingston (2014) explain that a completion disposition is a disposition to refrain from making significant changes to the work that is
What makes a story (in)complete? A look at Daniil Kharms’ absurdist discourse

grounded in certain cognitive mechanisms. This can help explain the pull of Publicism: artists who have adopted completion decisions will be disposed to publish their work. Nevertheless, Psychologism makes the wrong prediction for the Kharms’ discourse. Kharms adopted a completion disposition, forming a desire to share his work (leading him to go to jail), and thus Psychologism would predict that Kharms’ discourse is complete, thereby not capturing the intuition that is captured by Aestheticism, namely that it is an intrinsically incomplete story.

**Extrinsic/intrinsic theory of artwork completion:** Rohrbaugh (2017) attempts to refine Psychologism via a view which we call Satisfactionism: a work of art is complete iff it is intrinsically such as to have satisfied the artist’s creative intentions in making the work. The problem for Satisfactionism is that an artist’s creative intentions will not be sufficient in some cases to decide whether her work is complete, even if the artist examines the intrinsic features of that work. Many forms of art are social practices, a consequence of this being that the conventions and norms of the practice in which the artist is engaging can also contribute to what constitutes the ideal state of the work – independently of the artist’s creative intentions. For example, as argued above, Kharms’ discourse is incomplete as a story. This is so despite the fact that Kharms’ creative intentions – to show that art is derived from a violation of conventional story telling – are satisfied. Clearly, Kharms recognizes that the intrinsic features of his work are incomplete (that is his very intention!), but that recognition is not enough to warrant the discourse as a complete story. Calling it such misses the point that it rebels against conventional story telling by being intrinsically incomplete.

**Towards a theory of artwork completions:** Our view is that the common thread in the foregoing views is a failure to acknowledge two separate questions we can ask about completion: “Is the work complete?” and “Is the artist finished with the work?” The former is a question about whether the work is intrinsically complete; the latter is a question about whether the work is extrinsically complete. Of the foregoing views, all but one fail to take either intrinsic or extrinsic features into account, and this leads to the noted issues. Satisfactionism attempts to rectify this, but it’s still an implausible analysis because it takes intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to both point towards one kind of completion, thus conflating intrinsic and extrinsic completion. As soon as it’s recognized that intrinsic completeness and extrinsic completeness come apart, we can give two theories of completeness that make sense of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence separately:

- For any object $x$ and any artistic kind $K$, $x$ is an intrinsically complete $K$ iff $x$ is an instance of $K$.
- A work of art is extrinsically complete iff the artist has acquired a completion disposition with respect to that work.

**Application to Kharms’ discourse:** These working definitions allow us to make sense of Kharms’ work. As a discourse, it is intrinsically complete if we assume that a (linguistic) discourse is one that contains at least two sentences (Labov 1972, Hobbs 1990). On the other hand, it is intrinsically incomplete as a story assuming that a story consists, minimally, of an opening (sentences that “introduce a topic”, about which more is then to be said in subsequent sentences” (Kamp 2017)) and a closing, which is the resolution of some sort of a conflict (Labov & Waletzky 1967, Ochs & Capps 2001). As noted above, a closing is precisely what Kharms’ discourse lacks, which is the very point of Kharms’ work and what makes it absurd. As such, the work satisfies Kharms’ creative intentions. Hence, although intrinsically incomplete as a story, the work is extrinsically complete because, having his creative intentions satisfied by the work, Kharms acquired a completion disposition with respect to that work.

Marianne Vergez-Couret and Janice Carruthers

Un Còp Èra¹ … Comparative Analyses in Occitan Oral Narratives

In this talk, we would like to present and discuss a quantitative analysis of temporality in Occitan Oral Narratives from the ExpressioNarration project, which was financed by a Marie Curie Fellowship. This project aims to use contemporary linguistic theory to explore the relationship between language and orality, with a specific focus on key linguistic temporal features of oral narrative in Occitan and French.

Current models have challenged the oral/written dichotomy (Koch and Oesterreicher, 2001). However, our knowledge of how different types of orality operate is still patchy, and the description of the features of oral "genres" very underdeveloped, indeed non-existent in the case of most minoritised languages such as Occitan.

This talk will focus on the Occitan corpus (OcOr, Occitan Oral) (Carruthers and Vergez-Couret, at press) which reflects various levels of orality and offers the possibility of comparison along different parameters (eg. between different levels of orality [OOT, OOM] and between these and written texts that have oral sources [OWT]):

- OOT (Occitan, oral, traditional): stories drawn from fieldwork amongst native speakers in the Occitan domain, recorded by the COMDT and transcribed for the project. Language here is fundamentally oral, with almost no written influence.
- OOM (Occitan, oral, modern): stories recounted by contemporary artists, taken from existing recordings and two Toulouse storytelling event organised during the project. Story performance is oral and ‘spontaneous’ but sources are often written.
- OWT (Occitan, written, traditional): published literary stories, digitised and transcribed for the project. These are stories collected from oral sources and produced in a publishable written version which, we might hypothesise, differs substantially from the oral source (never recorded).

The corpus will provide comparative analyses on key linguistic temporal features that have been highlighted to have distinctive properties in oral discourse:

- the key role played on the narrative line by tense switching between past and present tenses which is a major cross-linguistic feature that can have textual, metalinguistic and expressive functions (see Fleischman (1990), Bres (1998) and Carruthers (2005));
- the use of certain connectors on the narrative line (such as alavetz, puish…) which operate very differently in written and oral discourse discourse (e.g. their function is often not primarily temporal in oral discourse, see Bras, Le Draoulec et Vieu (2001, 2003) on French puis);
- the performative role of ‘frames’ (e.g. un jorn, lo lendoman matin) (see below) which can have an important structural role in the particular type of memorisation and performance found in oral narrative (Carruthers, 2011).

The comparative analyses we propose are based on two main theories, the Framing Theory (Charolles, 1997) and the Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) which have been deployed very successfully to explore temporality in written discourse in a variety of languages. SDRT (which approaches the semantic coherence of discourse through a series of Discourse Relations [DRs] between clauses, such as Narration or Background) has proved to be particularly enlightening, allowing analysis to move away from attributing particular functions to particular tenses or connectors or adverbials (functions which are often not sustainable when applied to authentic discourse), towards an analysis that operates the other way round and asks, instead, how particular DRs are expressed linguistically. SDRT also offers the advantage of linking the analysis of phenomena such as

¹ Once upon a time...
tense, frames and connectors, since all are considered together as playing a role in the expression of certain DRs. Framing Theory regards the description of particular temporal adverbials at the head of groups of clauses, called “frame introducers”, which have both temporal and structural functions. However, those functions vary in non-narrative texts, where their role is primarily temporal, and in narrative text where their role is mostly structural (Le Draoulec and Péry-Woodley, 2005). Framing theory and SDRT have been much less widely deployed to analyse oral discourse. Indeed, this type of discourse-level approach has never been applied to oral Occitan, despite the fact that Occitan, as a regional language, offers a particularly rich context for the linguistic exploration of phenomena such as temporality in oral narrative. Given the high levels of variation in oral narrative and the distinctive use of tense switching, connectors and frames, our hypothesis is that SDRT and framing theory will offer (i) an innovative approach to key elements of temporality in oral Occitan and (ii) an analysis that will allow comparison between different levels of orality in Occitan.

Through a quantitative analysis of the three sub-corpora, the project will revisit the definition of ‘orality’ and offer a contribution to conceptual models that go beyond the oral-written dichotomy. The research questions which will inform our research objective include:
• How do the DRs and linguistic phenomena under analysis operate in the three corpora?
• How do the corpora compare with each other?
• How do the linguistic features in question relate to the nature and/or strength of the orality of the discourse?
• How significant are differences between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ Occitan narratives?
• How can we define and refine the concept of “orality”? And how can we contribute to conceptual models that move forward the theoretical debate around orality?

References
Online response to perspective-taking in narratives

In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the prominence status of a discourse referent has an influence on its availability as the perspectival center of a discourse: Discourse referents that are maximally prominent with respect to independently established scales such as grammatical role or type of referring expression are more likely to be perspectival centers than competing referents (Hinterwimmer 2017). We report an eye-tracking experiment in the visual-world paradigm on the processing of perspective-taking in narratives. We use free indirect discourse (FID) to indicate a shift in perspective.

FID can be defined as “mode of narration where we can listen to a protagonist’s thought” (Eckardt, 2014). Unlike direct or indirect discourse FID is not marked by quotation marks or accompanied by a verb that indicates a reported thought. FID can only be processed correctly if the reader is able to take the protagonist’s perspective. Characteristics of FID are, for example, interjections, judgmental statements, exclamations, discourse particles, rhetorical questions and a shift in deixis with respect to the discourse referent.

(1) Last Friday John wanted to go to a concert. Right before he got to the concert hall he checked his pockets. Oh no, had he really left the tickets at home? Now it was too late!"

In example (1) the rhetorical question as well as the exclamation can be easily understood as expressing a thought of John because of the interjection Oh no and the deictic expression now which contradicts the narrated time setting last Friday.

FID has been a topic of interest for literary scholars (Genette, 1998) as well as linguists in descriptive and theoretical terms (Banfield, 1982; Eckardt, 2014; Maier, 2015), but there is very little empirical research on the processing of FID. Also, lately there has been growing interest on the impact of perspectives in language comprehension, e.g. the interface of Theory of Mind and pragmatics; however, there is relatively little psycholinguistics research on the conditions under which shifts in perspective in narratives are possible (but see Kaiser 2015 and Salem, Weskott & Holler 2017).

In our experiment (n=40) we test processing of perspective-taking in FID using the visual world paradigm (Huettig et al., 2011). We use twenty-two test items in German consisting of short stories narrated through four sentences (see example (2) below). In the first sentence (S1), the stories introduce one highly prominent protagonist with a proper name in subject position (i.e. Martin) and a second, clearly less prominent referent with an indefinite determiner phrase (DP) in object position (i.e. florist). The second sentence (S2) does not refer to any referent to avoid recency effects. In the third sentence (S3) we compare an utterance in FID (cond-a) involving at least three indicators — an interjection, a discourse particle and a deictic expression with respect to the prominent referent — to a sentence of similar content in narrative style (cond-b). Test items were read by a female German native speaker in a neutral manner.

(2) (S1) Martin fragte einen Floristen an einem Stand nach einem Blumenstrauß für den Muttertag.
(S2) Der Geruch der Blumen lockte jedoch einige Wespen an.
(S3) [cond-a] Oh, jetzt bloß ganz ruhig stehen bleiben, um die Mistviecher nicht zu reizen. [cond-b] Um Wespen nicht zu reizen, sollte man ruhig stehen bleiben.
(S4) Doch bald darauf flogen sie schon wieder weg.
Martin asked a florist at a stall for a bouquet for mother’s day. The smell of the flowers attracted some wasps.
[cond-a] Oh, better stand still now, not to aggravate those beasts. [cond-b] As not to aggravate wasps one better stand still.
Soon they flew away.
Along with the two competing discourse referents we show pictures of a distractor mentioned in the story and an unmentioned distractor. All four pictures were labeled, i.e. Martin, Florist, Wespe and Knopf, in an earlier familiarization slide to avoid confusion between the two referents. As the target sentence does not feature direct reference to any of the pictures presented on the screen, we expect the two referents to attract most gazes as they serve as possible anchors for the utterance. The hypothesis predicts more gazes on the subject in cond-a compared to cond-b as a result of the change towards subject’s perspective triggered by the FID. As we use several different indicators of FID, we expect the effect to show as the third sentence (S3) unfolds.

The figure shows the number of gazes recorded on the picture of the subject from the onset of the target sentence (S3). For the statistical analysis, we modeled the gazes during the first 3400 milliseconds (the mean duration of S3 across items) of S3 using the growth curve analysis as described in Mirman (2014) (interaction of two experimental conditions with all the terms of a fourth-order orthogonal polynomial as fixed effects). We observed significantly higher number of gazes on the subject in cond-a (significant effect on the intercept term). There was also a significant effect on each of the other three terms of the polynomial indicating a clear effect of perspective-taking between cond-a and cond-b.

Our findings suggest that more gazes on the most prominent referent in cond-a are due to the ascription of authorship of the utterance in FID. We regard these results as a proof of concept for further research employing the visual-world paradigm for investigating prominence status and perspective-taking in language processing.

References
In his *Reference and Reflexivity* (2001), John Perry outlines a resilient and versatile formulation of the causal chain picture of reference. Building out of the approach popularized by Kripke (1980) and Evans (1982), Perry illustrates a theory in which reference relies on reflexive content and a mechanism he terms coco-reference. Coco-reference facilitates our capacity to refer to and discuss fictional characters – something that Perry himself identifies in his work. The result is conceptual grounds on which disagreeing views concerning fictional elements can actually meet (rather than talking past one another), and a coherent take on correctness relative to fictional characters.

Coco-reference operates within a very particular picture – a network structure. Networks consist of utterances that purport to refer. Each such utterance forms a point in a network. The structure is straightforward. There is an origin – the thing named. When someone refers to it, someone else may co-refer with that reference. I say, “John is clever” and you reply “Yes, he is.” I may be referring directly, while you co-refer with my use of “John.” Your use of “he” borrows its reference from my use of “John.” This is *intentional* co-reference, in that its success depends on your intending to refer along with my utterance. A distal co-reference can coco-refer if conditions are such that the earlier utterance it co-refers with actually succeeded in referring originally. A network is thereby populated by a core of direct references and corresponding co-references. That core then branches out with coco-references, which depend on those original references for their success. A good example being “Plato,” where our references to the actual person echo across centuries of other coco-references, and co-references, and ultimately direct references – reaching the man himself. In the case of fictional characters – the only difference is in the origin. Rather than reaching a person, in the case of fiction, we reach an act of invention. We capture that invention at the moment of its imaginary creation, and pick it out as the target of our utterances.

This particular strain of reference does not depend on what each speaker *knows* about a given fictional character, but rather a causal chain with a shared *origin*. By virtue of this structure, two different speakers may refer to the same Sherlock Holmes even if one has only read *A Study in Scarlet* and the other has only read *The Sign of the Four*. They can both situate the same subject in their assertions – something that, in turn, allows them to make claims and to have disagreements about the character. What is more, we can situate these assertions relative to correctness – if not truth – which is itself something that can reach beyond the literal canon of works containing Sherlock Holmes.

The provision of semantic properties into the domain of fiction is intriguing, particularly given the trouble historically with unreal referents. However, this treatment remains external to fiction – it works insofar as we use it to talk *about* fiction, but little more. These semantic properties will not saturate the fiction itself. Among a myriad of minor ontological concerns, a structural issue stands out – one that concerns intentionality along more formal lines. Given that the structure of reference involves the *aboutness* of intentionality, consider a case in which Holmes says, “Watson has a hat.” In order to make sense of this, we must first locate “Watson.” Now, does Holmes ever meet Watson, so as make references that meet the origin of the Watson-network? The question is, of course, rigged. We may want to say that in his own fictional domain – he does. However, the *origin* of “Watson” is the act of invention expressed by the author – not Watson in the world of Sherlock Holmes. It follows that Holmes could only ever coco-refer, because he can never create any genuine references of his own. What is more, coco-referring is
conditional. Given the disjoint between the pseudo-reality of fiction and the genuine reality of the fictive origin, it seems that no coco-reference within fiction can attain the conditions necessary to successfully coco-refer. The issue being that if we did grant the characters successful coco-references, we would be admitting an appeal to the unreality of the characters themselves (given the origin) within their own utterances. This curious reflexive mechanism opens a number of interesting avenues for further investigation – ranging from the ontological relation between fiction and reality to logical semiotics.

Works cited:

